Iğdır and the Mount Ararat Rebellion – Part 3

THE YEAR 1928: AMNESTY AND POLITICAL IDENTITY

In 1928, two significant developments occurred simultaneously:

FIRSTLY, the Aghas and Beys who had been exiled in 1926 were granted amnesty and allowed to return to their homelands. Many of the returning aghas and beys sympathized with and supported the Mount Ararat Rebellion, fueled by the anger and disappointment of an unjust exile. A strange situation had emerged: just ten years prior, the leaders of the Hamidiye Regiments, who had clashed with and even massacred Armenian and Yazidi forces in Eastern Anatolia, in the Bayezid and Iğdır regions, were now collaborating with the Armenian Dashnak organization, working together for independence. As I mentioned before, the Mount Ararat Rebellion contained complex balances and tendencies that are difficult to understand.

There was only one Armenian in the rebellion region: Zîlan Beg. There were Armenians who came and went occasionally, but their purpose was to establish connections and deliver intelligence. They did not stay in the region for long periods.

The Kurdish tribes participating in the rebellion were, on the one hand, introduced to the ideological ideal of an "Independent Kurdistan" under the influence of Hoybun, and on the other hand, they were fighting for "resistance" against the military pressure and oppression established in the region after the Sheikh Said Rebellion. Sometimes these two components, namely Independent Kurdistan and Resistance to Military Pressure, overlapped, which in a sense made İhsan Nuri Pasha's job easier. Whenever there was a desire to send military units to the rebellion, especially from the Armenian diaspora in Iran, İbrahim Agha would not allow it, fearing the revival of past bitter memories. Some books even claim that Armenians in Soviet Armenia formed volunteer fighter groups among themselves, wanting to cross the Aras River to support the Mount Ararat Rebellion. This claim cannot be true for two reasons: Firstly, the border was strictly guarded by Soviet soldiers. It was almost impossible for even a single person to cross. Secondly, in those years, there was a significant Muslim Kurdish population in Soviet Armenia. If aid were to be delivered to the Mount Ararat Rebellion, it would have been expected that these Kurds would act first.

SECONDLY, İhsan Nuri Pasha sent special calls via couriers to tribal leaders in the Bitlis, Van, Muş, and Ağrı regions, asking them to join the movement. In a short time, the sphere of influence of the Mount Ararat Rebellion spread over a wide geographical area. The Republican Government, which had regarded the resistance movement between 1926-28 as "a handful of bandits," panicked in the face of the new situation and dispatched more military units to the Mount Ararat region to prevent another Sheikh Said Rebellion.

İhsan Nuri Pasha, a military man, organized the Kurdish forces into guerrilla groups called "deste," and prevented the army's advance on Mount Ararat with hit-and-run tactics. Although the idea of "deste" organization belonged to İhsan Nuri Pasha, İbrahim Agha was responsible for its implementation. This was because he knew the Mount Ararat region step by step. However, over time, each "deste" became self-willed, and the central authority structure collapsed in a sense. This reality is not widely known. One of the factors that led to the failure of the Mount Ararat Rebellion was the inability to establish good coordination and military discipline.

Among the important "deste" leaders were: İbrahim Agha, Ferzende Beg, Halis Öztürk (son of Abdulmecit Bey, commander of the Hamidiye Regiment), Seyitxan, Süleyman Ahmed, Sheikh Zahır and his brother Sheikh Abdurrahman, and Kör Hüseyin Pasha's two sons Nadir and Mehmet. Additionally, warriors from the Şemkan tribe such as Temıre Şemki, Çarxê, Osê, and Fettto gained fame for their bravery.

Kurdish tribes living in a wide geographical area stretching from Iğdır to Erzurum and from there to Bitlis formed a hit-and-run fighting force proportionate to their own strength, harassing the army forces advancing on Mount Ararat and trying to prevent their progress into the rebellion area.

The main striking and "deste" leaders mostly continued their activities at the foothills of Mount Ararat or in nearby villages and towns. I must also state that when the army forces wanted to advance from the foothills of Mount Ararat towards the summit, the "deste" forces showed extraordinary heroism, displaying a death-defying resistance with their very limited manpower, weapons, and ammunition. There are many accounts regarding this. However, I am content with outlining the general framework.

Hacı Abdullah Çoktin, the son of İbrahim Agha, who was at the rebellion site with his father as a 12-year-old child in those years, recounts important warrior names in his memoirs:

“The members of the Şemkan (Şemkî) tribe were the most striking and combative among those who participated in the rebellion. About thirty households had come. Brave and fearless warriors like Temır, Çerxe, Celil, Yusuf, Nadır, Fetto became known for their courage in the rebellion movement. From the Gêloi tribe (Gêloîs on the Doğubayazıt side), the brothers Mısto, Davo, and Celil, as well as Cihangir and Mıhê, also showed great heroism. İbrahim Agha especially kept Mısto by his side.”

Armenians living in the diaspora and Iran collected money among themselves and provided logistical support to the rebel forces. Hacı Abdullah Çoktin summarizes this situation as follows:

“One day, two Armenians, one named Zilan, came to the camp. They had about three kilograms of gold with them. Armenians from Tabriz and Tehran had collected donations and sent them. Among the provisions brought by Zilan were 10-15 wired telephones and clothes and garments to equip a company of soldiers. Special pasha-ranked clothes were also made for my father and İhsan Nuri. The Armenians also informed the committee that they wanted to come in armed groups and fight on Mount Ararat. İbrahim Agha was not keen on this idea.”

İhsan Nuri Pasha established a military headquarters. He hung the Kurdish flag at the entrance of the headquarters. He published a newspaper called Agrî (1929-1930) using a mimeograph machine. However, the number of people who read the newspaper was, of course, not large. He implemented a military organizational system, creating a hierarchy among the rebels by assigning ranks. Not content with this, he extended a magneto telephone network throughout Mount Ararat, thus having the chance to instantly communicate the army's movements to each other. However, these top-down changes did not find support among the rebel groups and lower-level leadership. İhsan Nuri Pasha wanted to give the movement a "national" character. But this had no resonance among the rebels. İhsan Nuri Pasha was slowly becoming aware that he was being pushed into isolation.

İhsan Nuri Pasha was an educated and idealistic Kurdish leader. He desired a Kurdistan in the modern sense, in line with nation-state principles, but he was alone in this thought. He was surrounded by various tribal leaders who were not in harmony with each other.

On the other hand, he did not receive the logistical, financial, and arms aid he expected from the Hoybun Society. He received news that 40 pistols and weapons were on their way to Mount Ararat, but these weapons never reached him. Soon after, he found himself in a very different reality: tribal conflicts, looting movements, and the factor of religion.

The greatest logistical support for the Mount Ararat Rebellion was provided by the Helikan tribe. The Helikan, entirely within Iranian borders and loyal to Halit Agha, would pay the price for this support in later years. Wounded fighters were treated in Helikan villages and summer pastures, returning to the front once recovered. In the final year of the rebellion, the Turkish and Iranian governments reached an agreement, and the Iranian government exerted extraordinary pressure on the Helikan tribe, leading the Helikan tribe to seek refuge in Turkey. We will revisit this situation in the final year of the rebellion.

THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR

From the 1960s onwards, many books were written about the Sheikh Said Rebellion. These books had a single purpose: "The Sheikh Said Rebellion is not a Kurdish Rebellion. It is certainly not a nationalist rebellion seeking Kurdistan. It had only one goal: to restore the caliphate abolished by Atatürk on March 3, 1924." For some reason, the Turkish Left in the 1960s went even further, complicating the situation with an absurd claim within an absurd thesis, stating that "the British also supported it."

The impact of these books was so great and profound that, while the Turkish Left had in-depth knowledge of or considered it their duty to learn about figures like "Che Guevara" and "Ho Chi Minh," who lived thousands of kilometers away from the geography of Turkey, they did not feel the need to investigate the validity of the thesis claimed about Sheikh Said, who lived right next to them.

As a result, the Turkish Left movement, in its publications, declared the Sheikh Said Rebellion a "reactionary" rebellion, effectively dismissing the rebellion movement. The word "Sheikh" also increased the credibility of this thesis as a "spiritual title." Soon after, a significant portion of the Kurdish Left also believed this thesis. However, as I mentioned in my previous article, the Zaza-Sunni group, which formed the core of the Sheikh Said Rebellion, had already been ignored by the Ottoman Administration and the Caliphate for centuries. Sheikh Said's idea of restoring the caliphate was illogical and impossible. And it did not happen. Do you know what happened instead? Thousands of books, newspapers, and magazines were written to portray the Sheikh Said Rebellion as a "reactionary rebellion aiming to restore the caliphate"... As a nature lover, I regret the number of trees cut down to defend an "absurd thesis."

Our topic is, of course, not the "Sheikh Said Rebellion." Do you know why I brought this up out of the blue? Similar theses were put forward for the Mount Ararat Rebellion. As I stated in my previous article, the Kurmanji-Sunni Kurdish group was the closest to the Ottoman Administration and the Caliphate Institution. All the tribes that participated in the Mount Ararat Rebellion belonged to the Kurmanji-Sunni group. "To restore the Caliphate or to voice this" was most certainly the right of this group. But I want to state unequivocally: during the Mount Ararat Rebellion, not a single word was uttered or even used for propaganda purposes, such as "We want the Caliphate back." The fact that figures like Sheikh Abdülkadir, who were part of the leadership of the movement, held the title of "Sheikh" has been put forward as "proof" (!) by certain circles unfamiliar with the rebellion movement that it was a "reactionary" movement. But it has no relevance. Sheikh Abdülkadir was never concerned with the re-establishment of the "Caliphate" institution.

After all this, the question might arise: Did the "religious" factor have no effect at all in the Mount Ararat Rebellion? It did, but not in the sense of restoring the caliphate.

In the Mount Ararat Rebellion, the religious factor manifested itself in two ways:

• Reaction to Atatürk's hat and dress reforms
• The institution of Sheikhdom that had existed among the tribes for many years

THE HAT REVOLUTION

To bind those who participated in the Mount Ararat Rebellion to the uprising and to create a sense of justification, the leadership did not interfere with the natural structure of the religious factor. Indeed, most Kurdish youth had received madrasah education. However, religiously, formations like today's ISIS or similar fanatic organizations never emerged.

The leadership of the Mount Ararat Rebellion left the natural reactions against the newly established Republic to their own course, making no effort to prevent them. The people of the region, for example, were uncomfortable with wearing "hats," rejecting it as a "symbol" of the Republic. The leadership did not make any suggestions on this matter; this reaction occurred spontaneously and naturally.

As you know, Atatürk introduced the Hat Revolution in 1925. While the rebellion's leadership tried to make the fighters accept the Kurdish national identity or the necessity of the rebellion, it seems highly probable that they also used the "hat and dress revolution" as an excuse to increase loyalty to the rebellion.

In the narrative of the late Gurci Selçuk, there is such a statement: "Among the rebels, a rumor circulated that 'they will force us to wear hats, they will remove the veils from our wives' faces,' giving the impression that they were fighting for this."

Similarly, we understand a similar narrative from the memoirs of the late Şamil (Ayrım) Bey. A gang emerged among the rebels that engaged in looting, forcibly seizing the property of poor people, whether Kurdish or Azeri, such as sheep, horses, and camels, and smuggling them to Iran to sell them there. This gang also seized Şamil Bey's camels. Şamil Bey went to Mount Ararat with great difficulty to meet with the rebels. The late Ziya Ayrım Bey summarizes his father's experiences as follows:

“There is a wintering building near Serdarbulak on the slopes of Mount Ararat. In the 1950s, when I was the Farm Manager, we turned it into a summer pasture, regulated its water, and produced cheese. My late father, accompanied by İsa Yiğit Bey, the son of Ali Mirze Bey, and other horsemen, went to this wintering place. That was the meeting point. On the way, near the village of Bilican, three or four horsemen appeared before them. They were tasked with taking my father and the caravan to the headquarters. One of them recognized my father as soon as he saw him, dismounted his horse, embraced my father's stirrup, and kissed his hand. It turned out they had fought on the same front with my father in Tuzluca during the National Struggle years! Then they all arrived at the headquarters together.

The leader was sitting proudly, leaning against cushions spread on the ground. Around him, his armed men were waiting, ready from head to toe. My father was walking five or ten steps ahead of his accompanying relatives. He approached the leader and threw five or six packs of cigarettes into the middle. Cigarettes were the most consumed and sought-after item. My father took off his hat, placed it on the ground, leaned on the cushions, and began to speak. The leader occasionally stood up and walked around, and all of my father's relatives, who were squatting on the ground, stood behind him. He hit the late Meşe İbrahim, Nurettin Kirman's father, with the butt of his rifle, saying, 'Ew filleye!' meaning 'This is an infidel!' The other patrols repeated the leader's words, making Meşe İbrahim groan under the rifle butts. My father understood that this anger was due to the hat. After all, the hat was known as a European, i.e., non-Muslim, style of dress, and there was no sign of the Hat Revolution here yet. Meşe İbrahim was targeted for harassment because he had not taken off his hat.”

THE INSTITUTION OF SHEIKHDOM

During the Mount Ararat Rebellion, there was a leadership cadre that stood out with the title "Sheikh."

I would like to enlighten my unfamiliar readers on one point: it is possible to group individuals with the titles "Sheikh" or "Seyit" in Iğdır, Ağrı, and the surrounding region into two categories. The first group consists of religious scholars who taught in madrasahs, spent most of their time with their students, and particularly read and interpreted the books of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi and other scholars, thus truly dedicating themselves to the "spiritual" world. They saw themselves as above tribes, and even had Arab and Turkish students among them. Religious scholars belonging to this group had no direct involvement with the rebellion movement.

The second group consists of individuals like Sheikh Abdülkadir, who held social, economic, tribal, political, and spiritual power. These individuals directly supported the rebellion. Their influence over the tribes was significant and sometimes decisive.

Here, I would like to make a note and tell an anecdote. As I mentioned before, the Celali Tribe, which left its mark on the Mount Ararat Rebellion, consists of three main branches: Helikan, Sakan, and Hesesori (Bırxkî). There is no institution of Sheikhdom in the Helikan group.

The Gêloî tribe, to which I belong, is also part of the Helikan group. Similarly, the leader of the Kotan Tribe, the late Hüsrev Bey (Xosrof Beg), is affiliated with the Helikan group. I will now leave the rest to the narrative of the late Hüsrev Konyar Bey:

“The Helikan tribe, throughout its historical development, never harbored the institution of 'sheikhdom' within itself. Since the topic of the Helikan's devotion to religion has come up, I would like to recount a memory I have with Mecit Hun.

When Mecit Hun moved to Ankara, he became my neighbor. One day, we were chatting in my office:

‘Mecit, how is your day going?’

‘I wake up very early in the mornings and go for a walk. Then I take a shower and have my breakfast.’

I immediately interjected:

‘Mecit, wouldn't it be better if you started your day by performing the morning prayer?’

Mecit Hun replied with a laugh:

‘Did my grandfather Ahmed (Konyar) Agha ever pray that I should pray!’ The Ahmed Agha he referred to was my own grandfather. Mecit Hun was right.”

In short, the institution of sheikhdom in the Mount Ararat Rebellion encompassed spiritual, social, and political essence all at once. Sheikh Abdülkadir was both the social, political, and spiritual leader of the Sakan tribe. Therefore, he represented extraordinary power.

In my next article, I will discuss the conflict between two Kurdish tribes settled on Mount Ararat that marked the years of the Rebellion.

TO BE CONTINUED