Politics in the Shadow of Rent-Seeking: The Impasse of Developing Countries

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In societies like Turkey, which simultaneously exhibit characteristics of both developing and underdeveloped countries, politics has become centered on the distribution of rent-seeking rather than being a field of ideological struggle. People's primary concern is the question, "Through which party's opportunities can I enter the world of rent-seeking?" For this reason, ideologies, programs, and values remain secondary; the main determining factor is the ability to latch onto the networks of benefits provided by political parties. Indeed, it is observed that many parties establish structures that could be called "internal mafias," and these structures create a hierarchical chain of benefits among members. Consequently, politics in Turkey functions more as an extension of the rent economy, typical of underdeveloped countries, rather than a competition of ideas and policies as seen in developed countries. THREE FACES OF POLITICS: 1. POLITICS IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES In underdeveloped countries, politics is almost entirely built upon the distribution of rent. State mechanisms are weak, and the law is not independent. Those who hold political power establish a kind of "spoils system" by transferring public resources to their own circles. In these countries, the primary goal of entering politics is to use state opportunities for personal or group gain. Ideology is merely a cover; the essential thing is to be close to power and to get a share of the rent. 2. POLITICS IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES In developed countries, politics has a more institutionalized structure. Resources are distributed transparently, and state tenders and personnel appointments are subject to independent oversight. Therefore, the main area of political competition is not rent-seeking, but programs and ideas. Of course, interest-based relationships are not entirely absent, but thanks to strong institutions, politics operates within a framework that limits rent-seeking and prioritizes public benefit. Here, people join parties not to obtain rent, but to represent their ideological and political values. 3. POLITICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Developing countries, on the other hand, exhibit a structure caught between these two extremes. On one side are efforts towards modernization, democratization, and institutionalization; on the other side are rent networks and patronage systems. Therefore, politics has a dual nature: it proceeds through promises of development and change, while those who gain power continue the rent system by transferring state resources to their own circles. In these countries, even intra-party competition often arises not from ideological differences, but from the struggle over the distribution of rent. THE IMPASSES OF POLITICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
In developing countries like Turkey, politics is the scene of a clash between two different orientations: on one side, promises of modernization, democratization, and development; on the other side, rent distribution, patronage, and interest networks. This contradictory structure constantly turns politics into an area of crisis. Especially, the greatest effort of political parties is to list "promises" one after another to gain legitimacy in the eyes of society. Most of the time, these promises are false, exaggerated, or almost impossible to fulfill. Grand projects, promises of high welfare, or radical reform rhetoric voiced in election rallies actually serve as a curtain to cover the rent-sharing system operating behind the scenes. Thus, while the public is directed to vote with hopeful promises, those in power spend their main energy on transferring state resources to their own circles. As a result, politics ceases to be a tool for change and progress for society and turns into a stage of false promises where rent is hidden. HIGH COMPETITION AND INTRA-PARTY CONFLICTS
In developing countries, politics has much higher competition compared to developed countries. This is because holding political power also means direct access to economic resources. Therefore, fierce struggles occur not only between parties but also within parties themselves. If a political party has established a strong and functioning system for rent distribution and has been able to offer this as a guarantee to its base, it is highly likely to increase its chances of coming to power. However, if a structure emerges within the party where ethnic or sectarian groups become prominent, and these groups clash over who will control the rent, the path to power for that party is blocked. This is because the anxiety and distrust about who will control the rent once in power weaken intra-party unity and do not inspire confidence in society. This leads to that party remaining in opposition. Turkish politics is one of the most concrete examples of this reality. POPULISM AND SHORT-TERM POLICIES
To maintain public support, short-term distribution of benefits takes precedence over long-term development and reforms. Social aid, state positions, tenders, and incentives become populist tools. This creates a culture of dependency in society, and democratic consciousness cannot develop. Parties that come to power with grand promises often lack the institutional strength and economic means to fulfill these promises. Therefore, since they cannot fulfill their promises, they are forced to resort to populism and short-term policies to maintain their power. This strategy is, in a sense, an effort to "buy time": temporary satisfaction is provided to society by constantly offering new aid, amnesties, or incentives. However, since long-term planning and reforms are neglected, problems are not solved, only postponed. As a result, politics ceases to be a tool for development and democratization; it becomes trapped in a spiral of populist practices focused on getting through the day. DEPENDENCE ON STATE OPPORTUNITIES
Since there is no strong private sector and institutionalized economy, the opportunities provided by the state increase the attractiveness of politics. In Turkey, parties that come to power use this situation for their own benefit, largely distributing civil service positions and public resources to their supporters. Openly or covertly, the message conveyed to society is: "If you stay close to my party, you too will benefit from these blessings." This understanding prioritizes the search for securing their children's future in people's voting preferences, rather than ideological or political values. Therefore, voters gravitate towards the party that holds state opportunities and continue this tendency in every election. In such a system, if a party that comes to power manages rent distribution correctly and successfully establishes the perception of "stay close to me, and you will also profit" in society, it largely guarantees the continuity of its power. This transforms politics from a democratic competition into a mechanism of loyalty and dependency where state resources are distributed. MAFIA-LIKE STRUCTURES
Cliques and mafia-like structures emerge within parties that control rent networks. These structures either open or close the way for advancement within the party. Thus, politics ceases to be an arena for democratic participation and becomes an arena managed by hierarchical chains of benefits. Whether the political party one belongs to has come to power or has taken control of mega-city municipalities, in both cases, similar mafia-like structures quickly take root. State and municipal tenders are distributed through these structures, and commissions received are shared among the cliques.

This system leads many people who enter politics with zero capital to acquire enormous wealth and property in a short time. Shares obtained from tenders become the primary source of political financing. What is interesting is that society does not question the source of this wealth. This is because the desire to acquire wealth, a showy lifestyle, and property is the most powerful guiding tool in public opinion. Instead of asking, "where does this money come from," people focus on the question, "how can I seize such an opportunity." An understanding spreads where people calculate which mafia-like group to approach to get a share of this spoils economy. Thus, politics transforms into a spoils system where transparency and accountability disappear, and mafia-like networks manage the rent.

MILITARY COUPS AND THE RENT SYSTEM Military coups are not only interventions that change the direction of politics; they are also turning points that reshape the rent system. In post-coup periods, officers' salaries are increased, and extensive housing and vacation opportunities are provided. The path is opened for individuals with military backgrounds in state tenders, and a race to gain a share in important economic areas ensues. Retired generals and high-ranking officers are appointed to strategic positions on the boards of public institutions or large private companies. Thus, the rent-sharing system in politics is rebuilt, this time in line with the interests of the military bureaucracy. This situation shows that in developing countries like Turkey, politics is seen as a "source of rent" not only by civilian actors but also by military elites. Military coups were often carried out not for ideological reasons, but to seize and protect this rent system. As a result, a coup, while suppressing the democratic demands of society, also transforms into a mechanism that perpetuates the economic and social privileges of the coup plotters. TODAY'S PICTURE Today in Turkey, politics has transformed from strong ideological struggles into an arena of competition based on the sharing of state opportunities. The party or coalition in power not only determines the country's policies but also manages a wide network of benefits, from tenders to bureaucratic appointments. This structure also manifests itself to varying degrees in opposition parties. CONCLUSION The differences in politics between developed, developing, and underdeveloped countries actually demonstrate the strength of institutions and the embeddedness of societal values. While politics in developed countries is mostly driven by ideas, programs, and long-term policies, in underdeveloped countries, politics is almost entirely based on rent distribution and benefit sharing. In countries like Turkey, which are developing and also exhibit characteristics of underdeveloped countries, politics is caught between these two extremes. In Turkey, politics is largely perceived by the public as a source of rent; ideologies, programs, and values often fall into the background. Political parties, rather than being mechanisms of democratic representation, have become channels through which state resources are distributed. For this reason, intra-party cliques and mafia-like structures have become central to politics, and politics has become a tool for resource sharing rather than solving societal problems. To overcome this impasse, Turkey must first strengthen institutional transparency, establish the rule of law, and ensure that ideological-political struggle regains its value. Only in this way can politics emerge from the shadow of rent-seeking and become a tool capable of solving society's real problems.