A Slice of South Caucasian History: Khanates, Governorates, and the 1905–1920 Rupture

Dear Readers, The history of the South Caucasus from the 18th to the 20th century is the story of a geography experiencing three distinct political orders in succession: first, the dynastic system; then, imperial bureaucracy (guberniya); and finally, revolution, nationalism, and border wars. At the heart of this transformation lies the Aras basin, and particularly the Surmalu Uyezd, or the Iğdır line. The Dissolution of the 1720s, the Rise of the Khanates After 1747 The 1720s marked the period when the Safavid order began to unravel, and central Iranian authority lost control over the Caucasus. The real rupture occurred in 1747 with the assassination of Nader Shah. After 1747, local military elites in the South Caucasus began to establish de facto spheres of power. During this process, the khanates of Karabakh, Ganja, Shaki, Shirvan, Quba, Baku, Talysh, Derbent, Erivan, and Nakhchivan emerged. South of the Aras, the Maku Khanate was located. These khanates were not modern ethnic states. The foundation of the state was the dynasty. Power rested on the following elements:

• The military might of the khan's family
• Tribal alliances
• The tax collection system
• Allegiance to the superior dynasty in Iran

The geographies of the khanates were multi-ethnic. Armenians, Muslim Turkic communities, Kurdish tribes, Yazidis, and other groups lived intertwined, village by village. Identity was defined not by nationalism, but by local and sectarian affiliations. In foreign policy, the khanates were first subordinate to the Shia Kurdish-origin Zand dynasty, and then to the Oghuz-origin Qajar Turkic dynasty. This allegiance was not merely symbolic; the khanates regularly paid taxes to these dynasties, sent soldiers when necessary, and demonstrated their loyalty through practical obligations. This relationship was not modern national allegiance, but hierarchical imperial loyalty. The Arrival of Russia and the End of the Khanates

Russia's permanent establishment in the South Caucasus at the beginning of the 19th century did not happen suddenly; this process was the result of a diplomatic and military chain that began along the Georgian line.

In 1783, the Treaty of Georgievsk was signed between Russia and the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti (Georgia). According to this treaty, the Georgian kingdom accepted Russia's protection, and Russia pledged to protect Georgia's territorial integrity and dynasty. This marked the beginning of Russia's entry into the South Caucasus with a legal basis.

However, this protectorate system was soon tested. In 1795, Agha Mohammad Khan, the founder of the Qajar dynasty, marched on Georgia and severely devastated Tbilisi. Russia was obliged to protect Georgia under the Treaty of Georgievsk; however, under the conditions of the time, it could not carry out an effective military intervention. This event led to the direct demand for Russian protection by Georgian elites and rulers.

In 1796, Russia organized a short-lived Caucasian campaign, but the real rupture occurred in 1801. During the reign of Tsar Paul I, the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti was formally annexed and Georgia was directly incorporated into the Russian Empire. Thus, Russia became not merely a "protective power" but a directly sovereign actor in the South Caucasus.

This annexation inevitably led to conflict with Iran. The Qajar dynasty viewed Georgia as within its sphere of influence. Russia's annexation of Georgia opened the door to the Russo-Iranian wars, which would also determine the fate of the khanates in the South Caucasus.

At the end of the 1804–1813 and 1826–1828 wars, two major treaties were signed:

With the 1813 Treaty of Gulistan, Russia gained dominance over khanates such as Karabakh, Ganja, Shaki, Shirvan, Derbent, Quba, and Baku.

With the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay, the Erivan and Nakhchivan khanates were also ceded to Russia. The Aras River became a new and definitive border between Iran and Russia.

At this point, the khanate system effectively ended. The khans were either removed from office or reduced to symbolic positions. The local military aristocracy was replaced by imperial bureaucracy. The South Caucasus was no longer part of the Iranian-centric hierarchical loyalty system, but of the administrative and military order of the Russian Empire.

The 1783 Treaty of Georgievsk between Russia and Georgia, the 1795 Qajar attack, and the 1801 annexation; followed by the Treaties of Gulistan and Turkmenchay, marked the beginning of a two-century Russian period in the South Caucasus.

The khanate system ended. The Guberniya (Governorates) Period and the Surmalu Uyezd After abolishing the khanates, Russia aimed to govern the region not through traditional local power balances, but through a centralized imperial bureaucracy. From the 1840s onwards, administrative reforms were initiated in the Caucasus, and finally, the Caucasian Viceroyalty was established with Tbilisi as its central administration. This structure was governed by a viceroy directly subordinate to the Tsar, and the South Caucasus transformed from a geography administered by dynasties to one managed by imperial officials. Over time, the region was divided into large provincial units called guberniyas. The main guberniyas in the South Caucasus were:

• Tiflis Governorate
• Erivan Governorate
• Baku Governorate
• Elisavetpol (Ganja) Governorate

These guberniyas were further divided into districts called uyezds. For example, within the Erivan Governorate, there were uyezds such as Erivan, Nakhchivan, and Surmalu. The administrative center of the Surmalu (Sürmeli) Uyezd was the town of Iğdır. The 1877–1878 Ottoman–Russian War further expanded this administrative map. At the end of the war, the Kars, Ardahan, and Batum regions came under Russian control. These new territories were not organized under the classic guberniya status, but as a special administrative unit called the Kars Oblast. There was a significant difference between a guberniya and an oblast. A guberniya referred to the established civil provincial structure of the empire and had a relatively settled administrative, legal, and financial system. An oblast, on the other hand, was a more specialized administrative status typically used for newly conquered, sensitive border security regions with a strong military aspect. The Kars Oblast was thus established as a form of administration with both military and civil powers, and a distinct border character. Thus, by the end of the 19th century, the South Caucasus had completely broken away from the world of khanates; it had entered a new political order shaped by a Tbilisi-centered imperial bureaucracy, guberniyas, and border oblasts. The Erivan Governorate was an important part of this structure. One of the districts of this governorate was the Surmalu Uyezd, and its administrative center was the town of Iğdır. While local bargaining was decisive in the dynastic era, registration, census, and central control became decisive during the guberniya period. The institutional infrastructure of modern political identities also formed during this period. Baku: Center of World Oil To understand 1905, one must understand Baku. At the beginning of the 20th century, Baku produced approximately half of the world's oil. This transformed Baku into the energy center of global capitalism. Oil wells, refineries, port facilities, and foreign capital turned the city into a massive labor hub. Perhaps Baku was one of the cities with the densest working class in the world at that time. This mass of workers was multinational. Armenian workers, Azeri workers, Russian workers, and other communities worked in the same fields. The 1905 Revolution and the Social Democratic Movement The 1905 Revolution erupted as a result of the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, economic crisis, and labor movements. The Russian Social Democratic Labor Party called for general strikes and political organization throughout the empire. Baku was one of the most important centers of this revolutionary movement. Joseph Stalin was in Baku during the 1905 period and participated in social democratic activities. He took part in organizing efforts among oil workers in Baku and strengthened the local networks of the revolutionary movement. The major oil strike at the end of 1904 and the calls for a general strike during the 1905 process turned Baku into a battleground of class conflict. Strike, Strikebreakers, and the Escalation of Ethnic Tension During strike periods, workers were divided into two:

• Those who participated in the strike
• Those who continued to work or were used as strikebreakers

This division was a class-based one. However, in a multi-ethnic city, class division quickly shifted to an ethnic line. Employers and local interest groups were able to manipulate ethnic and religious differences. Rumors spread. Neighborhood solidarities hardened. Class anger turned into ethnic anger. This process was not an "ethnic war" centrally planned by the Tsar. It was rather a natural consequence of the political vacuum and economic chaos created by the 1905 Revolution. However, the passivity of local administrators and, at times, their biased behavior did not prevent the escalation of violence. 1905–1906 Armenian–Azeri Conflicts The wave of violence that began in Baku in 1905 quickly spread to the Karabakh, Nakhchivan, Ganja, and Erivan lines. These conflicts were reciprocal.

• Armenian armed groups attacked Muslim villages.
• Muslim armed groups attacked Armenian settlements.

During this period, the Hunchak and Dashnak organizations already existed within Armenian society. Muslim society, on the other hand, formed the Difai organization in 1906, creating a counter-organization for political and defensive purposes. During the 1905 events, there was no independent Armenian or Azerbaijani state. The region was within the borders of the Russian Empire. Therefore, the 1905 violence should be considered as a reciprocal ethnic conflict created by the imperial crisis, not a planned policy of extermination between states. (Note: "Kacha-Kach" did not occur in 1905. A large wave of mass migration would emerge later.) When the Armenian-Azeri conflicts erupted in 1905, the demographic structure played an important role in the spread of events over a wide geography. According to the 1897 Russian Empire census, Armenians constituted the majority in the Erivan Governorate with approximately 52–53 percent; the Muslim Turkic population was around 37–38 percent. In the Elisavetpol (Ganja) Governorate, Muslim Turks were dominant with 55–60 percent, while Armenians were at 30–35 percent. In the Baku Governorate, Muslim Turks were approximately 40 percent, and Armenians were 18–20 percent; in the city of Baku, the Armenian population was over 30 percent, and the Muslim Turkic population was around 20–25 percent, with both communities living in the same neighborhoods, workplaces, and markets. This intertwined settlement pattern facilitated the rapid spread of violence between neighboring villages and neighborhoods. However, it is not historically accurate to consider the 1905 events as a centrally planned state policy; there is no definitive evidence that the Russian Empire systematically and officially supported Armenians. Nevertheless, the weakening of central authority during the revolutionary process, the late and inadequate interventions of security forces, and the differing attitudes of local administrators could not prevent the escalation of conflicts. Therefore, the 1905 violence should be considered as a wave of reciprocal ethnic conflict that emerged in a context where demographic intermingling, class tensions created by the oil economy, and the dissolving imperial structure in a revolutionary environment converged. The 1917 Revolution and the Birth of Republics After the February Revolution of 1917, local city committees and administrative boards that emerged in regions such as Surmalu Uyezd and Erivan Governorate served as de facto transitional administrations. However, this fragmented structure did not last long. 1897 Census, Iğdır city center (Игдырь / Ыгдыр) Total population: 4,680 people. Distribution of city population:   Population                  Percentage

• Armenians:                                                 3,934                 (84%)
• Russians:                                                        559                     (11.9%)
• “Tatars” (Azeri Turks):                           82                       (1.7%)
• Kurds:                                                           72                       (1.5%)
• Others:                                                          33                       (remainder)

  With the 1917 Russian Revolution, the Russians left the Iğdır city center. If we assume that the ethnic population growth rate in the Iğdır city center did not change between 1897 and 1917, we see that the Armenian population in the Iğdır city center reached 95% with the departure of the Russians from the city in 1917. (Note: Some historians from Iğdır write that a committee was formed at this time to govern the city center of Iğdır, consisting of 5 Armenians and 5 Azeri Turks. The establishment of such a committee in the Iğdır city center, where Armenians constituted 95% of the population, is not consistent with historical facts.) On February 23, 1918, the Transcaucasian Seim convened in Tiflis. This assembly aimed to bring together Georgian, Armenian, and Muslim representatives to form a common political umbrella in the South Caucasus. With the establishment of the Seim, some of the local committees were linked to this superstructure; regional political authority began to be defined through a Tiflis-centered assembly. However, this unity was short-lived. Although the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic was declared on April 22, 1918, internal political differences, war conditions, and external pressures could not sustain the federation. On May 26, 1918, Georgia declared its independence. On May 28, 1918, the republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan were established. Thus, the Transcaucasian Seim effectively dissolved. The common regional umbrella ended, and the South Caucasus entered the process of three separate national states. 1919 Elections, Boycott, and Legitimacy Crisis Elections were held in Armenia in June 1919. A significant portion of the Muslim Kurdish and Azeri population in the Surmalu Uyezd boycotted the elections. This created a serious legitimacy problem for the Republic of Armenia. There was already a security crisis in the border regions. The boycott further weakened political integrity. 1919–1920: Conflict and Kacha-Kach on the Surmalu Line From the summer of 1919, violence escalated again on the Surmalu and Aras line. During this period, Armenian Dashnak forces carried out:

• Village raids
• Forced displacements
• Killings of civilians.

The Muslim population in the region massively abandoned the area.

• Azeris sought refuge in Iranian Azerbaijan.
• Kurds sought refuge on the Ottoman/Turkish side.

This process of mass flight and displacement was remembered in local memory as "Kacha-Kach." The difference between 1905 and 1919–1920 is clear. 1905 was a wave of ethnic violence within the empire. 1919–1920 was a broader social rupture produced by state-building, border, and sovereignty crises. Conclusion Dissolution began in the 1720s. After 1747, khanates rose. In the 19th century, Russia arrived and the guberniya system was established. In 1905, Baku's oil capitalism, class struggle, and political vacuum turned into ethnic conflict. In 1918, republics were born. In 1919–1920, the Surmalu line experienced a great wave of migration and violence. The history of the South Caucasus between 1750 and 1920 is the harsh and bloody history of the transition from a dynastic order to modern border states.